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Abstract—Routing attacks remain practically effective in the
Internet today as existing countermeasures either fail to provide
protection guarantees or are not easily deployable. Blockchain
systems are particularly vulnerable to such attacks as they rely
on working, Internet-wide communication to reach consensus. In
particular, Bitcoin—the most widely-used cryptocurrency—can
be split in half by any AS-level adversary using BGP hijacking.
In this paper, we present SABRE, a secure and scalable
Bitcoin relay network which relays blocks worldwide through
a set of connections that are resilient to routing attacks. SABRE
runs alongside the existing peer-to-peer network and is easily
deployable. As a critical system, SABRE design is highly resilient
and can efficiently handle high bandwidth loads, including Denial
of Service attacks.
We built SABRE around two key technical insights. First,
we leverage fundamental properties of inter-domain routing
(BGP) policies to host relay nodes: (i) in locations that are
inherently protected against routing attacks; and (ii) on paths
that are economically-preferred by the majority of Bitcoin clients.
These properties are generic and can be used to protect other
Blockchain-based systems. Second, we leverage the fact that
relaying blocks is communication-heavy, not computation-heavy.
This enables us to offload most of the relay operations to
programmable network hardware (using the P4 programming
language). Thanks to this hardware/software co-design, SABRE
nodes operate seamlessly under high load while mitigating the
effects of malicious clients.
We present a complete implementation of SABRE together
with an extensive evaluation. Our results demonstrate that
SABRE is effective at securing Bitcoin against routing attacks,
even with deployments as small as 6 nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptocurrencies, and Bitcoin in particular, are vulnerable
to routing attacks in which network-level attackers (i.e., mali-
cious Autonomous System or AS) manipulate routing (BGP)
advertisements to divert their connections. Once on-path, the
AS-level attacker can disrupt the consensus algorithm by
partitioning the peer-to-peer network. Recent studies [15] have
shown that these attacks are practical and can significantly
disrupt the cryptocurrency. Specifically, any AS-level attacker
can isolate ∼50% of the Bitcoin mining power by hijacking
less than 100 prefixes [15]. Such an attack can lead to
significant revenue loss for miners and enable exploits such
as double spending.
Problem Protecting against such partitioning attacks is chal-
lenging. On the one hand, local (and simple) counter-
measures [15] fail to provide strong protection guarantees.
These include countermeasures such as having Bitcoin clients
monitor their connections (e.g., for increased or abnormal
delays) or having them select their peers based on routing
information. On the other hand, global counter-measures are
extremely hard to deploy. For example, systematically host-
ing Bitcoin clients in /24 prefixes (to prevent more specific
prefix attacks) requires the cooperation of all Internet Service
Providers hosting Bitcoin clients (which is highly unlikely)
and would increase the size of the routing tables. Even heavy
protocol modification such as encrypting all Bitcoin traffic
would not be enough to guarantee the system’s safety against
routing attacks as the attacker can still distinguish the traffic
from the headers and create a partition.
Our work In this paper we address the fundamental short-
comings of existing counter-measures. Specifically, we aim at
developing techniques that can secure a system like Bitcoin
against routing attacks in a way which: (i) provides strong
security guarantees; (ii) is partially deployable, i.e., it should
minimize the involvement of third parties; (iii) provides secu-
rity benefits early-on in the deployment.
SABRE: A Secure Relay Network for Bitcoin We present
SABRE, a secure relay network which runs alongside the
existing Bitcoin network and which can protect the vast ma-
jority of the Bitcoin clients against routing attacks. SABRE is
partially deployable and starts to be useful with as little as two
relay nodes. SABRE provides strong security guarantees to any
connected client—without increasing its load—by enabling it:
(i) to learn the latest mined blocks; and (ii) to propagate blocks
network-wide, which is essential for miners. We built SABRE
based on two key insights:
Insight #1: Hosting relays in inherently safe locations The
first insight is to host SABRE relay nodes in locations: (i)
that prevent attackers from diverting relay-to-relay connec-
tions, guaranteeing SABRE network integrity; and (ii) that
are in paths which are—from a routing viewpoint—attractive
to many Bitcoin clients, thus reducing the likelihood that
attackers will be able to intercept connections to the relay
network. To this end, we leverage a fundamental characteristic
of BGP policies, namely, that connections established between
two ASes which directly peer with each other and which
have no customers cannot be diverted. Only such ASes are
considered for relay locations. Some of these candidates are
also well-connected, making their advertisements attractive.
Through a thorough measurement study (using real routing
data), we show that such safe locations are plentiful in the
current Internet with 2000 ASes being eligible. These ASes
include large cloud providers, content delivery networks, and
Internet eXchange Points which already provide hosting ser-
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vices today and therefore have an incentive of hosting SABRE
nodes, e.g., for a fee. We also show that 6 SABRE nodes are
enough to protect 80% of the clients from 96% of the AS-
level adversaries (assuming worst case scenario for SABRE).
Insight #2: Resiliency through soft/hardware co-design As
a publicly-facing and transparent network designed to protect
Bitcoin, SABRE is an obvious target for attackers who could,
among others, craft (D)DoS attacks against its publicly-known
nodes to disrupt it. The second insight behind SABRE is
to leverage the fact that: (i) the content (blocks) that the
relays need to propagate at any given moment in time are
predictable and small in size; and that (ii) most of the relay
operations are communication-heavy (propagating information
around) as opposed to being computation-heavy. These two
facts enable us to use caching and offload most operations
to hardware, in particular, to programmable network devices.
This software/hardware co-design enables SABRE relay nodes
to sustain Tbps of load even when originating by malicious
actors (DDoS attackers).
We show that our relay node design is practical by im-
plementing in the P4 programming language [17], [13], the
default language for programming network data planes, along-
side the (UDP-based) client-side protocol. Our experiments
indicate that P4 is general enough to support SABRE and the
memory requirements are within the capabilities of today’s
switches.
Contributions Our main contributions are:
• The design of SABRE, a novel relay network that prevents
AS-level adversaries from partitioning it (Section III).
• An algorithm for positioning SABRE nodes in cherry-
picked ASes in order to optimize the security guarantees
they provide to the system they aim at protecting, in our
case Bitcoin (Section IV).
• A novel software-hardware co-design for SABRE relay
nodes that enables them to operate under high load, with
minimum software intervention (Section V).
• A thorough measurement study showing the effectiveness
of SABRE in protecting Bitcoin clients. In contrast, we
show that existing relays networks provide no protection
(Section VI).
• A complete implementation of SABRE, including the P4
code to run on programmable network switches [7] along
with an extension to the Bitcoin client code enabling it
to connect to a SABRE node (Section VII).
• An analysis of the incentives for candidate ASes to host
SABRE nodes (Section VIII). Among others, we show
that eligible candidate ASes already include well-known
cloud providers, which already provide hosting services.
Generality Although SABRE focuses on Bitcoin, which is by
far the most successful cryptocurrency to date, its routing and
system design principles can be applied to protect any other
Blockchain systems whose connections are publicly routed
over the Internet (including permissioned and encrypted ones)
from routing attacks. We discuss the broader applicability of
SABRE in Section IX.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we first present an overview of BGP and how
it can be misused to perform routing attacks (Section II-A).
We then briefly introduce Bitcoin and the concept of relays
(Section II-B).
A. Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
The Internet consists of over 60k individual networks known
as Autonomous Systems (ASes), which rely on BGP [46]
to exchange information about how to reach 700k+ IP pre-
fixes [10]. Each AS originates one or more IP prefixes which
are then propagated AS-by-AS.
Policies BGP is a single-path and policy-based protocol. Each
AS selects one single best route to reach any IP prefix—
including self-owned ones—that it selectively exports to its
neighboring ASes (omitting the AS from which it learned
the route). These selection and exportation processes are
governed by the business relationships each AS maintains
with its neighbors. The most common business relationships
are known as customer-provider and peer-peer [25]. In a
customer-provider relationship, the customer AS pays the
provider AS to get full Internet connectivity. The provider
provides such connectivity by: (i) exporting to the customer
all its best routes; and (ii) exporting the prefixes advertised by
the customer to all its neighbors. In a peer-peer relationship,
the two ASes connect only to transfer traffic between their
respective customers and internal users. They therefore only
announce their own prefixes, and the routes learned from their
customers to each other. Regarding route selection, an AS
prefers customer-learned routes over peer-learned ones and
peer-learned routes over provider-learned ones. If multiple
equally-attractive routes exist (e.g., if two customers announce
a route to the same prefix), an AS favors the route with the
minimum AS path length towards the prefix before relying on
some arbitrary tie-break [46].
Hijack BGP routers do not validate route advertisements. Any
malicious AS can create fake advertisements, known as BGP
hijacks, for any prefix, and advertise them to its neighbors.
Hijacks constitute an effective way for an AS to redirect traffic
directed to given destinations.
We distinguish two types of hijacks according to whether the
fake announcement contains: (i) a more-specific (longer) prefix
than a legitimate one; or (ii) an existing (equally specific)
prefix. In the former case, the hijacker AS will attract all
the traffic addressed to the more-specific prefix, independently
from its position in the Internet topology. This is because
routers forward traffic according to the most specific matching
prefix. In the latter case, the rogue advertisement will compete
with the legitimate one. The amount of diverted traffic then
depends on the relative positions of the attacker and the victim
in the Internet topology.
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Fig. 1: The effectiveness of a malicious AS in diverting traffic
using BGP hijacks depends on its position and on whether it
originates existing prefixes or longer ones. Here, AS 2 attracts
traffic from all ASes when originating 7/24 (a), but only from
AS 1 and 3 when originating 7/8 (b).
Fig. 1a illustrates an example of a more-specific attack in
which AS 2 advertises 7/24, a more-specific prefix of 7/8
which is advertised by AS 7. In doing so, AS 2 effectively
redirects the corresponding traffic from all ASes except AS 7.1
In contrast, Fig. 1b illustrates the effect of AS 2 advertising
7/8 alongside AS 7. AS 2 only manages to attract the traffic
from AS 1 and AS 3. Indeed, AS 1 learns two routes to 7/8
from its two providers (AS 2 and 5) and prefers the illegitimate
one from AS 2 because it is shorter. Similarly, AS 3 prefers to
reach 7/8 using the customer route via AS 2 to the legitimate
peer route learned via AS 5.
More-specific hijacks are more powerful but come with
drawbacks. First, such attacks are more visible since the
hijacked prefixes propagate Internet-wide. In contrast, existing
prefixes propagate in smaller regions [28]. For instance, in
Fig. 1b, while AS 4 and AS 5 learn about the hijacked prefix,
they do not propagate it further as they prefer the legitimate
announcement over it. Second, network operators often filter
BGP advertisements whose prefixes are longer than /24 [34],
thus preventing more-specific attacks against existing /24. Of
course, an attacker can still advertise the /24, i.e., an existing
prefix.
By default, hijacking a prefix creates a black hole at the
attacker’s location. However, the attacker can turn a hijack
into an interception attack and make herself a man-in-the-
middle (MITM) by preserving at least one path to the legit-
imate origin [45], [29]. For instance, in Fig. 1a, AS 2 could
selectively announce 7/8 to AS 1 to keep a working path to the
legitimate origin via AS 3. Observe that AS 2 cannot achieve
the opposite interception attack, i.e., divert the traffic from AS
3 and redirect it to AS 1 instead, as it does not learn a path
to the legitimate origin via AS 1.
B. Bitcoin
Bitcoin is a decentralized transaction system which relies on
a randomized peer-to-peer network to implement a replicated
1Traffic from AS7 itself is not redirected as AS7 relies on preferred internal
routing protocols such as OSPF to reach its own prefixes internally.
ledger, the Blockchain, which keeps track of the ownership of
funds and the balance of each Bitcoin address. The Bitcoin
network disseminates two types of information: transactions
and blocks. Transactions are used to transfer value from one
address to another, while blocks are used to synchronize the
state of the system. Bitcoin peers are identified by their IP
address, connect to each other using TCP, and exchange data
in plain text. Bitcoin comprises around 10k publicly reachable
peers [9], and 10× more NATed peers [16].
Blocks are created by miners and contain the latest trans-
actions as well as a Proof-of-Work (PoW). A PoW is a
computationally-heavy puzzle, unique for every new block,
whose difficulty is regularly adapted such that it takes 10
minutes on average to generate a new block [42]. A newly
mined block is propagated network-wide and included in the
blockchain according to consensus, thereby yielding a financial
reward to its miner. Bitcoin participants unaware of the latest
blocks will waste their mining power and can be fooled into
accepting invalid transactions.
Relay networks are overlay networks maintained by a single
administrative entity which run alongside Bitcoin’s peer-to-
peer network. Relay networks aim at assisting the Bitcoin
network, not replacing it. As an illustration, the three most
well-known relays nowadays are: Falcon [3], FIBRE [2], and
the Fast Relay Network (FRN) [5] and aim at speeding up
block propagation. These relay networks rely on a system of
high-speed relay nodes and/or on advanced routing techniques.
By connecting to these relays, a client can alleviate the effects
of bad network performance that may otherwise affect the time
needed to acquire a new block.
III. SABRE: A SECURE RELAY NETWORK FOR BITCOIN
SABRE is a transparent relay network protecting Bitcoin
clients from routing attacks by providing them with an extra
secure channel for learning and propagating the latest mined
block. By transparent, we mean that the IP addresses of the
SABRE relay nodes will be publicly known (e.g. via a website)
and that every Bitcoin client is welcome to connect to them.
To benefit from SABRE, a Bitcoin client simply needs to
successfully establish a connection to at least one relay node.
SABRE relays contribute to block propagation by receiving,
validating and transmitting new blocks to all connected clients.
To achieve its goals, the SABRE network must remain
connected at all times, even under arbitrary routing or DDoS
attacks. SABRE leverages two key insights to guarantee con-
nectivity: (i) smart positioning of the relays to secure its
internal connections and minimize the clients attack surface
(Section III-B); and (ii) a hardware/software co-design to
enable relay nodes to sustain almost arbitrary load (Sec-
tion III-C). We note that these insights can be used to secure
other Blockchain systems against routing attacks (Section IX).
We start by describing our attack model (Section III-A).
A. Attacker Model
We consider a single AS-level attacker whose goal is to
partition the Bitcoin network into two disjoint components
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Fig. 2: SABRE protects the Bitcoin network from AS-level adversaries aiming to partition it. Without SABRE, AS X can
split the network in half by first diverting traffic destined to AS H and AS G using a BGP hijack and then dropping the
corresponding connections (Fig. 2b). With SABRE, the network stays connected (Fig. 2c).
S and N . To do so, she first diverts the traffic destined to
S or N by performing an interception attack using existing
and more-specific prefixes (Section II). The attacker then: (i)
identifies the Bitcoin connections by inspecting the network
and/or transport layer headers (i.e., by matching on IP ad-
dresses and/or TCP/UDP ports); and (ii) drops the connections
bridging the partition. Such an attacker is powerful and can
effectively split the Bitcoin network into half [15]. In fact,
partitioning any Blockchain system constitutes an effective
DoS attack, and can result in revenue loss and allows double
spending (see Section IX).
We assume that the attacker knows: (i) the IP addresses
of all SABRE nodes; along with (ii) the code running on
the relay nodes. As such, the attacker can also hijack the
prefixes hosting relay nodes and drop all traffic destined to
them. Alternatively, the attacker can perform a DDoS attack
on the relay network, by directing load against its nodes aiming
at exhausting their resources.
Example We illustrate the attack using Figure 2a and 2b
which depict a simple AS-level topology composed of 9
ASes. ASB, ASD ASH and ASG host Bitcoin clients who
establish Bitcoin connections to each other (in blue). ASX is
malicious and aims at disconnecting the nodes on the left side
(S = {b1, d1, d2, d3}) from the others (N = {h1, g1, g2, g3}).
To that end, ASX intercepts the Bitcoin connections directed
to N by hijacking ASH and ASG prefixes. As a result, ASX
diverts all the connections from S to N , and some more
(e.g., the connection from h1 to g1). We depict the diverted
connections in red in Figure 2b. Once on-path, the attacker
drops the Bitcoin traffic crossing the partition and forwards
the rest normally. For instance, the attacker does not drop
the connection between h1 and g1 and simply relays it from
ASH to ASG untouched. Once the attack is launched, nodes
in S can no longer communicate with nodes in N : the Bitcoin
network is partitioned.
B. SABRE secure network design
We now explain the routing properties of SABRE node
placement that protect relay-to-relay, client-to-relay, and relay-
to-client connections from being disconnected. We describe
an algorithm for systematically finding such locations in
Section IV.
Protecting relay-to-relay connections SABRE network is
composed of relay nodes that are hosted in /24 prefix in
ASes that: (i) have no customers; (ii) have direct peering
connections; and (iii) form a k-connected graph.
These constraints secure relay-to-relay connections from
routing attacks for four reasons. First, they prevent any at-
tacker from diverting traffic among relays by advertising a
more-specific prefix, forcing her to compete with legitimate
advertisements, namely to advertise existing prefixes. Indeed,
routers will discard any advertised prefix that is longer than
/24. Second, these constraints prevent any attacker from
advertising an economically strictly better route than the
legitimate one. This is because the ASes hosting relay nodes
learn the legitimate prefixes via direct peer links and do not
have customers, meaning that no malicious AS can advertise
a more preferable route. Third, these constraints limit the
number of malicious ASes which can advertise an equally-
preferable route to only those ASes that directly peer with
the ASes hosting relay nodes. Finally, they ensure that the
chances for such attackers to divert relay connections decrease
exponentially as k (i.e., the connectivity of the relay graph)
increases. Indeed, BGP routers rely on an arbitrary tie-break
to select among equally-preferred routes (e.g. by choosing
routes learned from the lowest peer address [46]). Assuming
that the attacker is equally likely to win this tie-breaking, she
would only have a 3.1% (0.55) probability of disconnecting a
5-connected relay network. In Section VI, we show that well-
connected relay networks are numerous.
Protecting client-to-relay connections While we can selec-
tively place relay nodes (we discuss the incentives for ASes
to host relay nodes in Section VIII), we cannot re-position all
Bitcoin clients (or host them in /24 prefixes). This means that
client-to-relay connections cannot be made inherently secure
against all possible AS-level adversaries and active routing
attacks.
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We protect client-to-relay connections by further restricting
where we host SABRE relays to ensure that they not only meet
the criteria to secure relay-to-relay connections but also that
their respective advertisements will tend to be preferred by
ASes with Bitcoin clients over competing ones. Doing so we
can lower the amount of traffic a malicious AS can effectively
divert, i.e. maximize SABRE’s coverage.
Although, individual relays are unlikely to protect an AS
against all possible attackers, a set of relays can often do so.
Indeed, this can happen if for each possible AS-level adversary
there is a relay who can beat her by offering a better route. As
the set of Bitcoin clients tend to be highly centralized [15],
we show in Section VI that a relatively small relay network
is enough to protect many clients.
Protecting relay-to-client connections Finally, an attacker
might try to attack traffic sourced by the relay network to
the Bitcoin clients. For instance, an attacker could hijack the
prefixes of Bitcoin clients and drop the relay connections by
matching on any relay IP address. While this attack is more
cumbersome (there are way more clients than relays), it is
nonetheless possible. SABRE prevents this attack by obfus-
cating the traffic exchanged between the clients and the relay
nodes, forcing the attacker to perform full inspection (beyond
L4 headers) on a possibly huge volume of diverted traffic,
henceforth rendering the attack highly impractical compared to
the gain. Observe that while encrypting the already-obfuscated
traffic would render even full inspection useless, encryption
alone would not help as the attacker would still be able to
match on the destination IP.
To obfuscate the traffic we suggest two techniques. First,
the relays could modify their source IP addresses when
sending to the regular clients. This is possible as SABRE
uses connectionless communications between the relays and
the clients, enabling clients to accept packets with a different
source IP than the one they send traffic to. Second, clients
could connect to the relay via a VPN/proxy service, forcing
the attacker to first find the mapping between the proxy IP
and the corresponding bitcoin client.
Example Using Fig. 2c, we now explain how a SABRE
deployment of three relays, namely r1, r2 and r3, protects
against routing attacks such as the one shown in Fig. 2b by
securing intra-relay connectivity and maximizing coverage.
With respect to Fig. 2a, each Bitcoin client is now connected
to a least one relay node in addition to maintaining regular
Bitcoin connections. Here, nodes g1, g2, g3 are connected to
relay r1 while node g1 is also connected to node r3. Hosted
in ASes that peer directly, relay-nodes protect their internal
connectivity against ASX’s hijacks. For instance, consider
that ASX advertises the /24 prefix covering r1 to ASC. Since
ASX is a provider of ASC, ASC discards the advertisement
as it prefers to route traffic via a peer instead. At the same
time, forming a 2-connected graph allows the relay network to
sustain any single link cut. This can be caused by a failure, an
agreement violation or an unfiltered malicious advertisement
from another direct peer such as ASF to ASD. Observe
#Acontrol plane
data plane
SABRE
#B
hardware
software
"hijackable" bitcoin connection
secure connection
block
SABRE
UDPUDP
TCP
Fig. 3: SABRE offloads most communication to the switch
that this would not hold if r2 was not deployed. Finally,
the exact positioning of relays is such that the paths towards
them are more preferred over those of the attacker. As an
illustration, ASX can divert the connection from ASG to
ASD by advertising a path with a better preference (as a
peer) than the one originally ASG uses (a provider route,
via ASF ). Even so, ASX cannot divert the connection from
ASG to ASB. Indeed, ASG will always prefer its customer
path over any peer path.
C. SABRE resilient software/hardware node co-design
As a publicly-known and accessible relay network, SABRE
nodes should be able to sustain high load, either caused
by legitimate Bitcoin clients or by malicious ones who try
to exhaust their resources. To scale, SABRE nodes rely on
software/hardware co-design in which most of the operations
are offloaded to programmable network switches (e.g., P4-
enabled ones). As an illustration, in Fig. 3 two SABRE nodes
are connected to each other and to some Bitcoin clients. One
client talks directly to the controller via the switch, while the
others only to the switch.
Particularly, SABRE’s relay design is based on the observa-
tions that: (i) the content that needs to be cached in relay node
is predictable and small in size, consisting in the one or two
blocks of 1MB that were most recently mined; and (ii) most
of the relay operations are communication-heavy, consisting in
propagating the latest known block to many clients and dis-
tinguishing the new one. The former allows effective caching
(extremely high hit rate) while the latter allows for a partially
hardware implementation in programmable network devices.
This software/hardware co-design enables SABRE nodes to
operate at Tbps and therefore sustain large DDoS attacks.
Indeed, Barefoot Tofino programmable network devices can
deal with as much as 6.5 Tbps of traffic in the backplane [7].
While using programmable network devices enable high
performance, it does not make it easy due to the lack of a broad
instruction set and the strict limitations with respect to memory
and number of operations per packet. We overcome these
limitations with three techniques. First, our software/hardware
design seamlessly blends in hardware and software operations,
enabling to automatically escalate operations that cannot be
done in the switch to a software component. In SABRE, only
the validation of new blocks (which happen once every 10
5
minutes) needs to be escalated while all other requests are
served by the hardware over a UDP-based protocol. Second,
our implementation relies on optimized data structures which
are both memory efficient and require a fixed number of
operations per-access. Third, we heavily precompute and cache
values that would need to otherwise be computed on the switch
(e.g., UDP checksums).
IV. SABRE SECURE NETWORK DESIGN
In this section, we formally define the problem statement
of selecting the relay hosting ASes (Section IV-A) so as
to minimize the possibility of a successful routing attack
against Bitcoin before presenting an algorithm for solving it
in Section IV-B and IV-C.
A. Problem Statement & Challenges
The security provided by SABRE depends on: (i) how secure
the intra-relay connectivity is, i.e., how many connections an
AS-level adversary needs to hijack to disconnect the graph;
and (ii) how much of the Bitcoin network is covered, i.e., how
likely it is that an AS-level adversary will be able to prevent
each particular client from connecting to all relay nodes.
Thus, given a level of intra-relay connectivity to achieve
(e.g., 2-connectivity), our goal is to maximize the Bitcoin
coverage. Formally, we define our problem as follows:
Problem statement Let G = (AS, E) be the AS-level
topology graph in which vertices (AS) correspond to ASes and
edges (E) to inter-AS links. Let also B ⊆ AS be the subset of
ASes that host Bitcoin clients and R ⊆ AS be the subset of
ASes that have no customers. Finally, let G′ = G[R, E′] be
the subgraph of G induced by R and the subset E′ ⊆ (R×R)
of peer-peer inter-AS links. We define A = AS × B as the
set of all attack scenarios, namely all pairs of ASes (a, b) in
which AS a acts as AS-level adversary for AS b with Bitcoin
clients. Let S : R → A be a function which, given a candidate
relay AS, finds the subset α ⊆ A of attack scenarios that this
candidate AS protects against. Let furthermore C : P(A)→ R
be a function (P(·) denotes the power set) which, given a set
of attack scenarios α ⊆ A, quantifies their significance for
the Bitcoin system by computing the sum of all scenarios in
α weighted by the number of Bitcoin clients hosted in the
victim AS, i.e. C(α) =∑(x,v)∈α wv where wv is the number
of Bitcoin clients in AS v.
We want to find the subgraph G′′ = G′[R′] of R′ ⊆ R
such that |R′| = N ; G′′ is k-connected; and C(⋃ri∈R′ S(ri))
is maximized. Put differently, we aim—for a fixed number
of relays N and relay inter-connectivity k—at maximizing
the number of attack scenarios Bitcoin clients are protected
against.
Challenges Solving the above problem optimally is chal-
lenging for at least three reasons. First, the effectiveness of
any subset of relays R′ depends on the union of the sets
of the attack scenarios each relay r ∈ R′ protects against.
As these are in general not disjoint, this problem reduces to
the maximum coverage problem. Second, finding k-connected
Fig. 4: Shades illustrate preference. Traffic from AS V to a
whiter AS is less likely to be hijacked
subgraphs in a random graph is difficult [20]. Third, one needs
to be able to predict the forwarding path from each AS with
Bitcoin clients to a relay considering any possible attacker.
We develop a heuristic to address the first two challenges
(Section IV-B) and an algorithm for finding the possible attack
scenarios for every attacker (Section IV-C).
B. Positioning SABRE Relays
Given a number N of relays and their desired connectivity
k, our algorithm returns a set of ASes R′ in which to host
relays such that the connectivity and size requirements are
met and weighted coverage is maximized. This maps to the
maximum coverage problem with an additional connectivity
constraint. Thus, we use a greedy approach, shown to be
effectively optimal for the maximum coverage problem [24].
Our algorithm starts with an empty set R′ and the set
of candidate ASes R which satisfy the constraints listed in
Section III-B and are also contained in at least one k-connected
subgraph of at least N nodes, as only those can host one
of the relay nodes of a k-connected network of N relays. It
then iteratively adds relays to R′ to maximize the number of
covered attack scenarios while preserving k-connectivity for
R′. This simple procedure runs in O(N) and works well in
practice (Section VI).
In particular, in each round, we first select as candidates
R′k ⊆ Rk \R′ which are connected with at least min{k, |R′|}
of the already-selected ASes in R′. Then we add the candidate
r ∈ R′k that offers the maximum weighted extra coverage
to R′new = R
′ ∪ {r}, i.e., the one with the maximum
C(⋃ri∈R′new S(ri)) − C(⋃ri∈R′ S(ri)) and we update the
R′ := R′new. When we have selected all candidates, so that
|R′| = N , we return R′.
We show in Section VI, that the resulting relay networks can
readily protect between 80% to 98% of the existing Bitcoin
clients (depending on the internal connectivity and number
of deployed nodes) from 99% of the potential attackers.
The complete pseudocode can be found in the Appendix A,
Algo. 1.
While our algorithm’s goal is to minimize the attack vector
rather than maximizing the deployment incentives, we discuss
those in Section VIII.
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C. Calculating covered attack scenarios
Having explained how we can position SABRE relays based
on the attack scenarios they cover, we now describe how we
compute these scenarios for each relay, i.e., how we implement
the function S. Specifically, we now describe how we compute
the set of AS-level adversaries which can successfully hijack
traffic sourced from an AS hosting Bitcoin clients (say AS V )
and destined to a relay AS (say ASR).
Our algorithm is based on the observation that if the fake
advertisement reaches the victim (AS V ), it will do so via
the same propagation path as any other prefix advertised
by the attacker ASM and will thus share its preference
characteristics. Therefore, to check whether the traffic from
AS V is vulnerable, we only need to compare the path from
AS V to ASR with the path from AS V to ASM . If the path
to ASM is more preferred by the last AS that the two paths
have in common, then ASM can successfully hijack traffic
from an AS V to ASR. This is because the last AS decides
which of the two routes to use and advertise further. Observe,
that the last ancestor is AS V itself if the paths from AS V
to ASR and to ASM are disjoint. The preference comparison
is based on business relations among the on-path ASes and on
the path length; namely, customers are preferred over peers;
peers over providers; and shorter paths over longer ones.
As an example, Figure 4 illustrates an AS-topology which
is augmented with the economic agreements between ASes.
Arrows are reversed with respect to the money flow (if any)
with providers being at the top and customers at the bottom.
The different shades illustrate how preferred advertisements
originating from certain ASes are compared to others in the
eyes of AS V . White is the most preferred and black the
least. For example, AS V would prefer an advertisement
from its customer ASA over any other advertisement (ASA
is white). Thus, if a relay is hosted in ASA, no AS can
divert the connection to it. Among different originators that are
reachable via a customer, the shortest path will be preferred.
As such, the first layer of customers is lighter than the second,
meaning that if a relay is hosted in, say, ASE, all of ASA,
ASB, ASC, ASD and possibly ASF and ASG are effective
possible attackers. Similarly, if a relay is hosted in V’s peer,
namely ASH , all the ASes in the customer cone of ASA are
possible attackers, as are ASes of shorter path length in the
peer cone. Finally, if the relay is reached via a provider, length
is not always relevant: In our example, ASM ’s advertisement
will be less preferred than those from ASA-ASH , and even
less preferred than ASL’s one. Although both paths are via a
provider, namely ASI , and the path to ASM is shorter, the
victim will not use it. This is because ASI , which is the last
common AS of the two paths, prefers the path via ASJ and
will not advertise ASM . The complete pseudocode can be
found in the Appendix A, Algo. 2.
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Fig. 5: The switch intercepts all incoming traffic, answers to all
UDP requests and redirects TCP traffic of whitelisted clients to
the controller. The switch contains the latest mined Block in
BlockMem and multiple components to track the connected
and banned clients (e.g.White/Black List, Connected) and
detect attacks (e.g. CheckSecret, SentLimit)
V. SABRE RESILIENT RELAY NODE DESIGN
While a sophisticated software-based implementation of the
relay node might work2, it will have 2-3 orders of magni-
tude lower throughput [31] compared to a hardware-based
approach making it especially vulnerable to DDoS attacks.
On the contrary, a hybrid implementation which utilizes pro-
grammable network devices can scale to billions of packets per
second and mitigate malicious client directly in the data-plane,
namely before they can reach the software component.
In this section, we explain the software/hardware co-design
behind a SABRE relay node (Section V-A) and its operations
(Section V-B). While the protocol itself is specific to Bitcoin,
similar techniques can be applied in other systems. We further
discuss this issue in Section IX.
A. Hardware/Software Co-Design
Figure 5 illustrates SABRE’s software/hardware co-design.
It is composed of a programmable switch connected to a
modified Bitcoin client, the Controller.
The switch is responsible for: (i) serving client connections;
(ii) protecting the controller from malicious clients; (iii) prop-
agating blocks; and (iv) distinguishing new blocks from old
ones. In contrast, the controller is responsible for validating
new blocks, advertising them to the connected clients and
updating the switch memory accordingly.
Relay clients establish UDP connections with the switch
and rarely regular Bitcoin connections (over TCP) with the
controller. Switches only allow approved Bitcoin clients to
establish connections with the controller. As most clients
“consume” blocks rather than producing them, we expect most
clients to only interact with SABRE through UDP connections.
SABRE’s UDP-based protocol is composed of 8 messages:
SYN, SYN/ACK, ACK, NCONN, GET SEQ, ADV, UPD
and BLK. Similarly to TCP, SYN, SYN/ACK, ACK are used
to prevent spoofing attacks. NCONN is used for notifying
2we discuss the possibility of a software deployment of SABRE in §VIII
7
the controller of new connections. GET SEQ, BLK and ADV
relate to block management. Specifically, GET SEQ enables
a client to request a particular segment of a block which is
sent as a BLK, while ADV enables a client to advertise a newly
mined block to the relay. Finally, a BLK message is also used
by the controller after an UPD to update the switch with the
latest block.
The switch maintains three data structures to manage client
connections and track down anomalies: PeerList, Whitelist,
Blacklist. PeerList contains information about connected
clients, i.e., those who successfully established the three-way
handshake. In contrast, Whitelist maintains information of
clients that are allowed to communicate with the controller
directly, while Blacklist contains clients that have misused the
relay and are banned. The switch also maintains one data
structure to store the latest block(s): BlockMem. BlockMem
is stored in indexed segments of equal size together with a
precomputed checksum for each segment to allow the switch
to timely reply with the requested segment avoiding additional
computations. Moreover, the switch contains two components
devoted to anomaly detection: SentLimit and CheckSecret.
SentLimit, detects clients that requested a block too many
times, while CheckSecret calculates a hash for verifying
whether the clients is using its true IP to connect to the relay
node, during the handshake. Finally, the switch also maintains
one data structure for checking whether an advertised hash is
known: Memhash.
In the following, we describe the different operations per-
formed by the relay and how each of them modifies each
of the data structures. In Section VII, we show that our
design can sustain 1M malicious and 100k benign client
connections with less than 5 MB of memory in the switch.
This memory footprint is only a fraction of the memory offered
by programmable switches today (tens of megabytes [32]),
allowing the switch to implement other applications as well.
B. Relay operations
We now describe SABRE relay operations in detail. The
client and controller are extended versions of the default
Bitcoin client and the switch is implemented in P4 [17]. Our
protocol defines four operations: (i) how regular Bitcoin clients
connect to a relay node; (ii) how a relay node propagates
blocks back to them; (iii) how a relay node receives and
validates blocks transmitted by the clients; and (iv) how the
controller updates the switch memory upon the reception of a
new valid block. For each operation, the switch ensures that
the relay’s resources are not maliciously exhausted.
Managing client connections In order to avoid spoofing
attacks, Bitcoin clients initialize connections to relay nodes
using a three way-handshake as shown in Figure 6a. As for a
normal TCP connection, the client first sends a SYN packet.
Upon receiving the SYN, the switch echoes back a secret value
calculated using the client’s IP address and UDP port in a
SYN/ACK packet. The client then includes this secret value
in the final (ACK) packet as a proof that it owns the source
IP address that it is using.
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(b) Transmitting Block
Fig. 6: (a) BTC client establishes a connection with the
switch using a 3-way handshake. (b) Relay advertises a new
block INV via the switch and transmits it using multiple BLK
messages after client requests using GET SEG messages.
Upon successfully completing the handshake, the switch
adds an entry for the client’s IP and port number in the
PeerList and notifies the controller via a NCONN message.
The PeerList is implemented as Bloom filter (BF) for memory
efficiency. As such, it enables the switch to verify that an
incoming packet belongs to an established connection and drop
it otherwise. BFs do not support listing all inserted items. as
such the controller needs to store the connections for future
use (e.g., advertising new blocks and updating the PeerList).
Learning new blocks Relay nodes need to learn new blocks
that are mined. New blocks are transmitted to the relays
from regular clients. Being a network device with limited
computational capabilities, the switch is unable to validate
blocks. Thus, advertised blocks need to be transmitted to the
controller after they have been filtered by the switch.
As illustrated in Fig. 7a, the node advertises a block by
its hash to the switch using an ADV message. The switch
checks whether the hash is already known using the HashMem.
If the hash is not known, then the switch asks the client to
connect to the controller with a CTR message and stores its
IP in the Whitelist. If the transmitted block is legitimate the
client’s IP will stay in the whitelist for four days. The client
connects to the controller as if it was a regular Bitcoin client,
while the switch forwards the TCP traffic to the controller.
The switch only allows packets from white-listed clients to
reach the controller. Observe that a malicious miner cannot
monopolize or overload the controller with its connections as
even a pool with 30% of the hash power cannot keep more
than 172 whitelisted clients in any given moment.3
Yet, a malicious miner might still try to engineer block races
3Every day, 144 Blocks are mined (on average). For each block at most
one node is whitelisted (the one that is not already whitelisted and advertised
the Block first)
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(b) Updating switch
Fig. 7: BTC client advertises a new Block. The switch identi-
fies it as is an unknown block. The client gets white-listed and
is thus permitted to connect directly to the controller as if it
were a regular BTC client. If the received Block is valid: (b)
the controller updates the switch using an UPDATE message
carrying the Block’s hash followed by a BLK messages
carrying the data.
by flooding the relay node with multiple blocks simultaneously
which will need to be validated by the controller. To shield
against this attack, the switch keeps the number of active
nodes that are white-listed. When this number exceeds a
predefined threshold set based on the controller’s hardware
capabilities, the switch will stop whitelisting new clients. In
this case, the controller receives blocks from the nodes that are
already whitelisted. These nodes should be diverse enough,
with respect to mining power origin, to keep the relay up-
to-date, thanks to the expiry mechanism in the Whitelist. For
instance, any pool with at least 0.17% of mining power can
keep at least one node in the Whitelist forever. In essence,
the switch implements a simple yet efficient reputation-based
access-list to protect the controller from Sybil attacks.
Updating switch with a new block If a newly-transmitted
block is valid, the controller updates the switch’s memory
with a new mapping between segment ID and block segment
data that corresponds to a particular block hash. The switch
can then transmit the segments to the clients upon requests.
Observe though that the switch sends data to a UDP socket.
Thus, the IP and UDP checksums need be correct for the
packet to be accepted. The UDP checksum is calculated using
a pseudo-header and the one’s complement sum of the payload
split into 16 bits segments. Because computing this in the
switch would result in too many computations, we cache the
precomputed the one’s complement sum of the block segment
together with the segment itself. Using this value the switch
needs only to add the header parts that are different per client.
Figure 7b illustrates the sequence of packets the controller
sends to update the switch. Initially, it sends an UPDATE
message containing the new hash. This first message tells
the switch to prepare its state for the new block. The next
messages are sent to transmit each of the segments of the
block as well as a precomputed one’s sum of it.
Propagating a newly-learned block The relay node adver-
tises new blocks to all its connected clients who can then
request a block segment-by-segment. Blocks are transmitted
in multiple individual segments for three reasons: (i) to allow
clients to request lost segments independently; (ii) to avoid
loops in the data plane which would be otherwise needed as
the block does not fit in one packet; and (ii) to protect against
amplification attacks.
As illustrated in Figure 6b, the controller sends an INV
message which is forwarded by the switch. This INV message
contains the hash of the new block as well as the number
of segments necessary. In the example, the relay advertises
hash #5 which is composed of 23 segments. If the Bitcoin
client is unaware of the advertised block, it requests it using
a GET SEG message containing the hash of the block and
each of the 23 segment IDs. In the example, the client first
requests the segment of ID:1 of the block with hash #5 then
the segment of ID:2 and so on. If either the GET SEG or the
SEG is lost the client will simply request the corresponding
segment again.
As a protection mechanism, the switch bans clients that re-
quest a block multiple times. To that end, all requests traverse
a heavy-hitter detector, namely SentLimit. In SABRE, we just
reuse a component optimized for programmable switches [47]
which can operate with just 80KB of memory.
VI. NETWORK ARCHITECTURE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate SABRE’s efficiency in protecting
Bitcoin against routing attacks. Specifically, we answer the
following questions: How effective is SABRE in preventing
routing attacks targeted against the entire network and indi-
vidual clients? How does this effectiveness change with the
size and the connectivity of the SABRE network? How does
SABRE stand out against other relay networks and known
counter-measures?
We found that even a small deployment of 6 single-
connected SABRE nodes can prevent 94% of ASes in the
Internet from isolating more than 10% of the Bitcoin clients;
while larger deployments of 30 relays that are 5-connected can
prevent more than 99% of the ASes from isolating more than
20% of Bitcoin clients. In addition, we show that existing relay
networks, like Falcon [3] and FIBRE [2], offer no protection
against routing attacks. Finally, we show that SABRE provides
security level on-par with hosting all clients in /24, an effective
but clearly impractical solution.
We start the section by describing our methodology (Sec-
tion VI-A) before presenting our results in detail.
A. Methodology
Datasets Our evaluation relies on a joint dataset combining
routing and bitcoin information. Regarding routing informa-
tion, we rely on the AS-level topology and AS-level policies
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Fig. 8: Less than 2.5% of ASes are able to disconnect more
than 15% of clients. Thus, the chance that a random AS-level
adversary will be able to simultaneously hijack many clients
is extremely low. (N : the number of deployed relays; k: relay-
graph connectivity; Tie breaks in favor of the attacker)
provided by CAIDA [1], collected in May 2018. We rely on
the routing tree algorithm [29] to compute the forwarding path
followed between any two ASes. We consider that the paths
originated by an attacker AS are systematically picked at the
tie-breaking state of the BGP decision process (the worst-case
for SABRE) 4. Regarding Bitcoin information, we rely on the
IPs of Bitcoin clients from [8] along with the IPs of existing
relay nodes from [2], [3], both collected in May 2018.
We merge the two datasets by associating each Bitcoin IP
to the AS advertising the most-specific IP prefix covering it
(using the routes collected by RIPE BGP collectors [4]).
B. SABRE security efficiency
SABRE protects against network-wide partitions To eval-
uate how effective SABRE is against adversaries that wish to
partition the Bitcoin network, we quantify how likely it is for
a random adversary to be able to disconnect multiple clients
from the relay network. The fraction of clients a particular AS
can disconnect from the relays poses an upper bound to the
maximum partition that she can create in the Bitcoin network,
as Bitcoin nodes connected to the relay network cannot be
partitioned.
Fig. 8 illustrates how protected the Bitcoin network is
depending on the size N and internal connectivity k of the
SABRE network. The graph shows, for each given fraction y
of Bitcoin nodes, what percentage of ASes would be able to
independently disconnect it from SABRE.
For N = 20, k = 1, less than 3% of ASes are able
to prevent a considerable fraction of Bitcoin clients (15%)
from connecting to the relay network. In contrast, more than
90% of the clients can be isolated by any AS in the current
network [15].
4Results for the opposite case, where tie-breaking systematically picks paths
originated by relay ASes, can be found in Appendix B
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Fig. 9: 85% of the clients are protected against 96% of possible
attackers (Tie breaks in favor of the attacker)
The mapping between the number of possible attackers
and the partition sizes varies with the size and connectivity
of SABRE. In particular, increasing the number of deployed
nodes decreases the chances that adversaries can divert traf-
fic successfully. On the other hand, decreasing the intra-
connectivity requirements (i.e., the value of k) allows our algo-
rithm (Section IV) to select from a larger set of relays and thus
to form a more effective SABRE. This creates an interesting
trade-off between how secure the intra-relay connectivity is
and how well the relays cover the existing Bitcoin network.
For example, while a SABRE of 6 relays that are connected in
full-mesh (5-connected graph) is extremely hard to partition,
as the AS-level adversary would need to divert 5 peer-to-peer
links, it enables more AS-level adversaries to disconnect a
large part of Bitcoin clients from SABRE. For example, 3%
of ASes can potentially create a partition including 22% of
Bitcoin nodes. In contrast, a 1-connected SABRE allows fewer
attackers to perform severe attacks—only 1% of ASes could
create a 12% partition—but can be partitioned by a single link
failure or successful hijack from a direct peer.
SABRE protects most individual clients To evaluate how
effective SABRE protects individual clients, we look at how
likely it is for Bitcoin clients to be prevented by a random
AS-level adversary from reaching all relay nodes.
Fig. 10 shows, for a given percentage of ASes, what per-
centage of Bitcoin clients could be attacked and disconnected
from SABRE by this percentage of ASes.
We see that 80% of the clients are protected from 96% of
the AS-level adversaries even with a SABRE network of only 6
nodes that are 5-connected. There is again a trade-off between
secure intra-connectivity and the coverage of Bitcoin clients.
For example, a SABRE of 6 1-connected nodes protects 90% of
Bitcoin clients from 92.5% of ASes, while a fully connected 6-
node SABRE protects from only 89.5% of ASes. Interestingly,
increasing connectivity from k = 3 to k = 5 does not decrease
the protected clients significantly while making disconnecting
the relay network almost impossible.
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Fig. 10: SABRE is far more secure than deployed relays and
very close to the unemployable alternative countermeasure of
hosting all clients in /24. (Tie breaks in favor of the attacker)
C. SABRE efficiency compared to existing relay networks
We compare SABRE to FIBRE [2] and Falcon [3] with
respect to their effectiveness against routing attacks. We found
that SABRE outperforms both, for three key reasons.
Existing relays are vulnerable to longer-prefix hijacks All
relay nodes of both FIBRE and Falcon are hosted in prefixes
that are shorter than /24. As such, any AS-level adversary can
partition the relay nodes from each other as well as from the
Bitcoin clients only by hijacking 6 more-specific prefixes for
FIBRE and 10 for Falcon.
Existing relay networks are poorly connected Even if
these relay networks were to host their nodes in /24 prefixes,
we found out that their connections could still be diverted
by same-prefix advertisements. In particular, we found that
FIBRE relays would be disconnected by any of 652 ASes,
and Falcon by any of 3 ASes even if /24 prefixes were used.
Existing relays provide bad coverage Again assuming that
these relay networks would host their nodes in /24 prefixes,
their client-to-relay connections would still be more vulnerable
than those of SABRE allowing for more network-wide and tar-
geted attacks. We compare those relay networks with SABRE
with respect to how well they protect against routing attacks
using the same graphs as in Section VI-B. In particular, Fig. 10
shows the percentage of ASes that are able to independently
isolate a fraction of the Bitcoin network as a function of this
fraction while Fig. 11 shows the cumulative percentage of
clients as a function of the number of AS-level adversaries
that could disconnect them from all relay nodes. While FIBRE
is slightly better than Falcon, SABRE outperforms both.
D. SABRE efficiency compared to hosting all clients in /24s
We now compare SABRE to the most effective counter-
measure against routing attacks: hosting all bitcoin clients in
/24 prefixes [15]. While effective, this countermeasure is also
highly impractical as it requires ISP cooperation in addition
to increasing the size of the routing tables Internet-wide.
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Fig. 11: Falcon does not protect many clients as it is central-
ized to only two ASes. SABRE performs on-par with hosting
all clients in /24 while being deployable (Tie breaks in favor
of the attacker)
We found that SABRE offers comparable level of protections
against network-wide and targeted attacks while being easily
deployable.
The comparison between the two approaches is not straight-
forward as SABRE protects the network even if the attacker
has already partitioned the Bitcoin Peer-to-Peer network while
the other approach aims at securing the Peer-to-Peer network
itself. In the following, we describe our methodology and key
results.
To compare the two alternatives with respect to their protec-
tion against partition attacks we need first to identify the AS-
level adversaries that would be able to isolate a considerable
fraction of Bitcoin clients using same-prefix advertisements
only. To do so, we use a breadth-first search on the AS-level
topology graph, which traverses the graph in order of descend-
ing preference (Section IV-C). We run the traversal from every
AS with Bitcoin clients X . All ASes that are traversed by
the search before another AS with Bitcoin clients are able to
isolate X from the Bitcoin network. This calculation gives
only a lower bound with respect to the possible partitions, i.e.
hosting all clients in /24 prefixes might offer less security
than what we computed. Our results are included in Fig. 10.
Indeed, hosting all clients in /24 prefixes would secure the
Bitcoin Network better than SABRE, as partitions larger than
20% would be possible for only 0.016% of ASes.
In order to compare how many attackers can successfully
isolate individual Bitcoin clients, we looked at the ASes that
are able to divert traffic from each of those clients to all
others in the network. The results are included in Fig. 11. The
two approaches show similar protection levels with SABRE
being slightly better at times. This is because SABRE can
place relays in any AS in the Internet, while the alternative
countermeasure is limited to the actual distribution of Bitcoin
clients.
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Fig. 12: A block can be successfully transmitted from node A
to node C via the SABRE after it has been validated by the
controller.
VII. SOFTWARE/HARDWARE CO-DESIGN FEASIBILITY
We validated the feasibility of our co-design by testing
it in practice using regular and modified Bitcoin clients
connected to the SABRE components, namely the P4 switch
and controller. We showcase that (i) a programmable switch
can seamlessly talk to a Bitcoin client without any software
interaction; and that (ii) the data-plane memory footprint is
low compared to the on-chip memory available in today’s
programmable switches.
Implementation/Testbed Both the controller and the clients
are implemented as extensions of the default Bitcoin client
version 0.16. The former containing ≈650 added or modified
lines of C++ code and the latter ≈680 lines. The switch is
implemented in ≈900 lines of P4 code. Our prototype runs
on Mininet [38] and uses the publicly available P4 behavioral
model (BMV2) [12] to emulate the switch. Our testbed (see
Fig. 12) is composed of three clients A, B, C along with a
relay-node consisting of a switch and a controller. Nodes B,
C (shown in red) are modified and are connected to SABRE,
while node A (shown in green) is an unmodified Bitcoin client.
The controller is also a modified Bitcoin client
Timing We walk through the life of a block that was mined
in the Bitcoin network and sent by the unmodified client A,
to a modified one, namely node B. The latter will advertise
the new block to the switch, which will allow node B to
connect directly to the controller and transmit it. The controller
will then update the memory of the switch and will advertise
the Block to the connected peers (e.g., C). Next, node C
will request and receive the block in segments. The main
steps of this procedure are listed in Fig.12 which contains
for each step an index, a description and the time spent for it
in our prototype implementation. The most time-consuming
operations are updating of the switch and transmitting of
the Block, taking ≈7s each. These relatively large times are
because we rely on a simulated version of a P4 switch. The
only actual bottleneck in a hardware implementation would be
the uplink of the relay nodes.
Memory requirements We analytically calculated the mem-
ory for each of the components in the switch taking into
consideration the expected load. Table I summarizes our
Component Items False Positive Memory
BlackList: 1000000 0.001 1.80MB
WhiteList: 100 0.0001 239.75B
HashMem: 518823 0.0001 1.24MB
PeerList: 100000 0.0001 479.25K
BlockMem: 1 - 1.0MB
TABLE I: The memory used in the P4 switch is always <5MB
results. It comprises the name of the component, its capac-
ity, i.e., the number of elements that can be added such
that the false positive rate listed in the third column is not
exceeded. We can see that the cumulative memory needed
does not exceed 5MB which is within the limitations of
today’s programmable switches. The most memory-demanding
component is the Blacklist for which we budget 1 million
entries. This is necessary to allow for mitigating DDoS attacks.
In contrast, the components devoted to regular operations are
less memory-demanding since the number of legitimate clients
is significantly less. For instance, we only reserve space for
100k clients in the PeerList and 100 for the Whitelist; both
require less than 1MB. Observe that Bloom filters for regular
clients have a lower false positive rate than the Blacklist.
This enables to serve already connected clients even if the
switch is under such an extreme DDoS attack that the Blacklist
is flooded. We do not list the requirement of the SentLimit
component as they are negligible [47]. Finally, the memory
needed for the storing the latest block as well as for keeping
all known hashes takes about 1MB each.
VIII. DEPLOYABILITY & INCENTIVES
Similarly to existing relay networks (e.g. Fibre [2], Fal-
con [3]), SABRE requires one or more entities to deploy and
maintain its relay nodes. We now discuss the incentives and
the practicality aspects underlying a SABRE deployment.
Given the amount of money at stake,5 and the devastating
effects of routing attacks [15], important Bitcoin clients—
particularly miners—have an incentive to finance the hosting
costs of SABRE. ASes have therefore an incentive to offer a
SABRE service for a fee. We argue that such “business model”
is reasonable for two reasons.
First, we note that a large number of ASes that were found
to be good candidates for hosting relays are cloud providers,
CDNs, IXPs, large ISPs, or Software-as-a-Service (SaaS)
providers. This should come as no surprise as such ASes are
actively trying to establish as many peering connections as
possible to improve their services. Deploying SABRE nodes
in such ASes is practical as they already sell online services
or are research-friendly (IXPs [30]). Moreover, even if some
eligible ASes do not consent to host SABRE nodes, the
effectiveness of SABRE will not be affected as: (i) SABRE
only requires few nodes to be useful (as little as 6 ASes,
see Section VI); and (ii) there are more than 2000 possible
5As of 7 August 2018 Bitcoin market capitalization accounts for more than
120 billion of dollars.
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locations for hosting ASes. In short, no candidate AS is
irreplaceable.
Second, cloud providers already experiment with renting
our advanced hardware resources. As an illustration, Ama-
zon EC2 offers the possibility to rent hardware-accelerated
computing instances with field-programmable gate arrays [6].
We therefore envision that cloud providers could also rent out
hardware-accelerated computing instances with programmable
network data planes. If this is not the case, a pure software-
based implementation of SABRE would still protect the Bit-
coin network from routing attacks leaving DDoS to traditional
solutions. Such software-based implementation of SABRE can
readily be deployed as it only requires the possibility to host
virtual machines.
Finally, we note that while SABRE requires some effort to
be deployed, it is much more practical than known alternative
solutions [15] such as requiring all ASes to deploy secure
routing protocols or expecting all ASes with Bitcoin clients to
filter their routes.
IX. DISCUSSIONS
We now provide answers to high-level concerns about
SABRE, including how much of its design generalize to other
Blockchain systems.
Doesn’t SABRE centralization violate the decentralization
premises of Bitcoin? No, for three main reasons. First, it acts
alongside Bitcoin and does not aspire to replace or compete
with the existing peer-to-peer network. Instead, SABRE en-
hances the connectivity and significantly reduces the attack
surface which would otherwise allow any AS-level adversary
to partition the network. Second, more than one SABRE-
like systems can harmoniously co-exist, each belonging to a
different entity. Indeed, regular clients or mining pools can
connect to them at the cost of a lightweight UDP connection.
Third, SABRE has the potential to allow less well-connected
miners to get their fair-share out of the block-rewards making
it less likely for others to engineer block races.
Observe that existing relays (e.g. Fibre [2], Falcon [3]) are
small in size and controlled by a single entity, just like SABRE.
Neither of these characteristics prevented them from having
significant and positive impact to Bitcoin, namely decreasing
its orphan rate.
Why focusing on Bitcoin? We focus on Bitcoin as opposed
to more state-of-the-art cryptocurrency (e.g., Ripple [14] or
Ethereum [11]) for three main reasons. First, Bitcoin is ex-
tensively studied [41], [21], [43] and the effectiveness of
routing attacks against it is well-understood [15]. In contrast,
more sophisticated Blockchain systems (e.g., Bitcoin-NG [23],
Ouroboros [35], OmniLedger [37], Algorand [26]) are not
yet deployed at large scale and thus their exact routing
characteristics are unknown. Second, Bitcoin remains the most
widely used cryptocurrency making its security paramount for
many users.
Still, one could argue that Bitcoin is a notoriously slow-
moving community. Yet, deploying SABRE does not need to
be approved by the community as a whole. Indeed, connecting
to a SABRE node simply requires an extended client establish-
ing lightweight UDP connections.
Can SABRE protect other blockchain-based systems from
routing attack? Yes. Although our work focuses on Bitcoin,
many of SABRE design principles are applicable to other
Blockchain systems. Next, we separately discuss the generality
of the network and the node design.
SABRE network design is useful for any Blockchain system
as it allows them to mitigate partition attacks [15]. Partition
attacks are a threat not only for permissionless or unencrypted
blockchain systems like Bitcoin, but also for permissioned
and/or encrypted ones. In fact, the only Blockchain systems
that are not vulnerable to BGP hijacks are those whose nodes
are all hosted within a single AS or corporate network as
their traffic is not routed via BGP. Specifically, SABRE allows
nodes to exchange information even if a malicious AS-level
adversary hijacks and drops traffic among them. In fact, the
properties upon which the SABRE network is built can also
be used by miners to interconnect and/or host their mining
power, or by new Blockchain systems to place their nodes
in a routing aware manner that is inherently robust to BGP
hijacks. Finally, SABRE network design would be useful even
to the most advanced Blockchain systems (e.g., ByzCoin [36],
OmniLedger [37]) that can mitigate the effects of partition
attacks by detecting the attack and freezing commits, effec-
tively turning the attack into a Denial of Service. In particular,
SABRE would allow them to retain liveness during the attack
as resolving a BGP hijack is a human-driven process that can
take hours [15].
In contrast to its network design, SABRE node’s design
is to some extent specific to Bitcoin. For example, systems
whose traffic is encrypted cannot be served exclusively from a
programmable network device. Even so, SABRE’s node design
exhibits two key properties that all blockchain system share
and onto which further systems can be built. First, blockchain
systems are communication-heavy (due to the need to reach
consensus) meaning that the use of programmable switches
can increase the throughput by offloading communication
burden to the hardware. Second, most popular items tend to be
predictable, as most nodes will always request the latest mined
content, making SABRE-like caching strategies very effective.
X. RELATED WORK
Using P4 switches as cache Previous works have used
programmable network devices to cache values including
Netcache [33] and NetChain [31]. Netcache use Tofino
switches [7] as a cache for key-value stores, enabling them
to deal with skewed requests in memcached applications.
Similarly, NetChain [31] caches key-values stores in switches
to boost Paxos consensus protocols used in data centers to
coordinate servers. In SABRE, we also rely on switches to
cache information (here, blocks) which we complement with
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a novel UDP-based retrieval protocol and a dynamic access
list.
BGP security Many proposals have been proposed over the
years to reduce or prevent routing attacks. We distinguish
two approaches: origin validation and path validation. Origin
validation [39] relies on RPKI [18], a X.509-based hierarchy
mapping IP prefixes to ASes, to enable the routers to fil-
ter BGP advertisements originated from unauthorized ASes.
Path validation [40] secures BGP by adding cryptographic
signatures to the BGP messages. It allows the recipient of
an announcement to cryptographically validate that: (i) the
origin AS was authorized to announce the IP prefix; and
(ii) that the list of ASes through which the announcement
passed were indeed those which each of the intermediate AS
intended. Unfortunately, none of these proposals have been
widely deployed, leaving the Internet still widely vulnerable
to routing attacks [27]. In contrast, SABRE enables to secure
Bitcoin against routing attacks today, without requiring all
ASes to agree or change their practices .
Routing attacks on ToR Extensive work has been done
on routing attacks on ToR [50] and how these can be cir-
cumvented [48], [44] [49]. There are three key differences
between the ToR relay network and the Bitcoin network that
changes the spectrum of possible attacks and countermeasures.
First, in order to protect the Bitcoin system we need to keep
the network connected as opposed to preserving the privacy
of every single connection for ToR. As such, we can use
redundancy to protect Bitcoin clients, by connecting them to
multiple SABRE relays such that there is no AS that can
effectively hijack all connections. Second, counter-measures
against routing attacks on ToR are limited to avoiding routes
that might be affected by BGP hijacks, while we structure
SABRE to avoid the chance of an attacker to be able to divert
it in the first place. This is possible because Bitcoin clients
have no preference with respect to who to connect to as they
can get the same information from almost any peer. Third,
countermeasures against routing attacks on ToR do no deal
with the case that the client itself is hijacked.
Multicast protocols Mbone [22], was designed to multicast
live videos and music streams in the Internet, where many
routers do not support IP multicast. Using tunnelling, Mbone
traffic can stay under the radar of those routers. Despite
its novelty and usefulness, this network does not take into
consideration whether the used paths can be hijacked and does
not deal with maliciously increased load. Finally, systems such
Splitstream [19] that aim to reduce the load per node, require
a fixed set of participants and a certain structure among them
which would limit the openness of our network (regular clients
cannot easily come and go).
XI. CONCLUSION
We presented SABRE, a relay network aimed at securing
Bitcoin against routing attacks. The key insight behind SABRE
is to position the relay nodes in secured locations, preventing
AS-level attackers from diverting intra-relay communications
and reducing their ability to divert traffic destined to the relay
clients. To protect the nodes themselves, SABRE leverages a
hardware/software co-design (leveraging programmable data
planes) to perform most of the relay operations in hardware.
We fully implemented SABRE and demonstrated its effective-
ness in protecting Bitcoin, with as little as 6 relay nodes.
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APPENDIX
A. Algorithms
Below we include the pseudocode of the two main algo-
rithms described in the paper in Section IV-B and Section IV-C
respectively.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to find the best set of relays to
connect.
1: function LOCATERELAYS(C,C scens,N, k)
. C scens scenarios that each relay protects against
. N number of relays to deploy
. k desired connectivity
2: R ← {} . Relays to be deployed
3: R scens ← {} . scenarios R protects against
4: while R.length ¡ N do
5: Cs ← {c : c ∈ C \R s.t.G[R∪ c]is k-connected}
6: best r ← FindNext (Cs,C scens,R scens)
7: R.add(best r)
8: end while
9: return R
10: end function
11: function FINDNEXT(Cs,C scens,R scens)
12: best r ← None
13: best scens ← {}
14: best effect ← MAX
15: for r in Cs do
16: tmp scens ← R scens ∪ C scens[r]
17: if R scens.effect ¡ best effect then
18: best scens ← tmp scens
19: best effect ← R scens.effect
20: best r ← r
21: end if
22: end for
23: return best r
24: end function
B. Results with ties against the attacker
Although SABRE significantly improves the security of
Bitcoin against routing attacks the exact performance depends
on the on the tie-breaking decisions, namely which path is
chosen in cases that the competing routes are equivalent
economically and length-wise. In Section VII, we assumed
that the tie always breaks for the attacker. In the following,
we include the same result only now assuming that the tie-
breaking favors the legitimate destination.
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Algorithm 2 Compare two paths based on preference.
1: function MOREPREFERRED(pathA, pathB)
2: typeSeqA ← path type(pathA)
3: typeSeqB ← path type(pathB)
4: while pathA & pathB & hopA.pick==hopB.pick do
5: hopA ← pathA.pop()
6: hopB ← pathB.pop()
7: typeA ← typeSeqB.pop()
8: typeB ← typeSeqB.pop()
9: end while
10: if typeA 6= typeB then
11: switch (typeA, typeB) do
12: case (customer, peer)
13: return 0
14: case (customer, provider)
15: return 0
16: case (peer, provider)
17: return 0
18: case (peer, customer)
19: return 1
20: case (provider, customer)
21: return 0
22: case (provider, peer)
23: return 1
24: else
25: if len(pathA) = len(pathB) then
26: return 1 . In case of a tie, we prefer path B.
27: else
28: return argmin(len(pathA), len(pathB))
29: end if
30: end if
31: end function
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Fig. 13: When tie breaks in favor of the legitimate destinations:
a SABRE of only 6 relays that are fully connected prevents
all attackers from isolating more than 16%.
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Fig. 14: When tie breaks in favor of the legitimate destinations:
a SABRE of 10 5-connected relays protects 95% of the clients
from 99.5% of the AS level adversaries.
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
 12
 14
 16
 0  1  2  3  4  5
%
 o
f c
lie
nt
s 
th
at
 c
an
 b
e 
is
ol
at
ed
% of ASes that can disconnect at most y%
N=20 k=5 
N=20 k=3
N=20 k=1
N=6  k=5
N=6  k=3
N=6  k=1
Fig. 15: When tie breaks in favor of the legitimate destinations:
the largest possible partition by any attacker is 14% for a
SABRE of 6 relays that is 5-connected.
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Fig. 16: When tie breaks in favor of the legitimate destinations:
a SABRE of 20 relays that are 1-connected can secure 100%
of the clients against more than 98% attackers.
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